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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-IMPRIS-
ONMENT OF CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC-Defendant was convicted for
the third time of being drunk in a public place and received a
1 -2 years prison sentence. The Court of Appeals of Michigan held
that Imprisonment of a chronic alcoholic is not "cruel and unusual
punishment." People v Hoy, 143N.W 2d 577 (Michigan 1966)
It is almost universally agreed by medical authorities that alco-
holism is a disease and should be treated as such.- Nonetheless,
some courts have been slow and chary in adopting this consensual
belief to their decisions.2 A graphic example of this is the case
of one defendant who was sentenced to two years in jail on charges
of public drunkenness, despite the fact that he allegedly was a chronic
alcoholic and, as an impoverished inmate, could not obtain outside
medical aid.3 A more sympathetic appellate court however re-
versed the ruling on grounds that such a decision, m attaching
criminality to his conduct, affront the Eighth Amendment's pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
4
Both this reversal and a similarly successful appeal in another
jurisdiction 5 focused upon the mens rea of the defendant, even
though the courts were concerned with a strict liability offense, i.e.
public intoxication. That defendant has lost the power to resist ex-
cessive consumption of alcohol is the rationale in these vanguard
cases.
In earlier decisions, as well as the instant case, the courts have
pointed out that merely violating the public intoxication act is suf-
ficient in and of itself to convict and the issue of voluntariness is
immaterial.e The statute, by punishing irrespective of intent to
violate, comes under the general classification of police regulations,
1. GUTTMAcHTE & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw pp. 318-320 (1962), WALLER-
STEIN, HOSPITAL TREATMENT OF THE ALCOHOLIC p. 1 (1957). There are myriad sources and
these will suffice.
2. Aside from the instant case, e.g., Easter v. District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625 (D.C.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965), State v. Driver, 136 S.E.2d 208, 262 N.C. 92 (1964). These two cases
were later appealed and reversed, intra, see notes 5 and 4 respectively.
3. State v. Driver, supra note 2.
4. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
5. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
6. Supra note 2.
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the pupose of which one court defined as being "to require a degree
of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render vio-
lation impossible." But with respect to the alcoholic and the public
drunkenness statute, this purpose is inappropriate; the definition pre-
supposes that the alcoholic can muster a sufficient degree of dili-
gence to avoid drinking and public intoxication.
Moreover, a query can be raised as to the public policy involved.
It is anomalous to recognize the alcoholic to be laboring under an
intractable compulsion and, at the same time, impute criminality
to the act toward which the compulsion is directed. Is it desirable,
then, to incarcerate the alcoholic and thereby insulate him from
immediate medical treatment which conceivably could cure the
cause of his illness? This is the question with which the courts
in the two vanguard decisions grappled and whose answer emerged
from consideration of present public policy That is, they concluded
that society takes cognizance of the chronic alcoholic's inability to
abstain from drinking and no longer demands retribution for his
public drunkenness, but in lieu recommends rehabilitation.
Generally, most courts have readily observed that an intoxicated
person does not have control of his mental faculties.8 One court
opined that a drunk is a person under the influence of an intoxicant
and whose mind is materially impaired.9 For the purposes of
assessing guilt in terms of responsibility for one's actions, however,
the pertinent question is how did the defendant get into his intoxi-
cated condition--did it flow from a controlled will or voluntary
action or did it emanate from an overwhelmed will or involuntary
action? Consistent with these realities, the strict liability in the
public intoxication regulation can be interpreted, not as referring
to voluntariness in the use of alcoholic beverage, but as referring
to voluntariness in the subsequent drunkenness and public appear-
ance. In short, one who voluntarily drinks, drinks at the peril of
becoming drunk and appearing in public.10 This seems to be the most
reasonable construction of the statute and in some jurisdictions it has
been so interpreted." Hence, by considering volition in the use of
alcohol, the courts can exonerate the alcoholic from the charge of
7. People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 18 N.W. 365 (1884).
8. E.g., State v. May, 174 Neb. 717, 119 N.W.2d 307 (1963). State v. Painter, 261L
N.C. 332, 134 S.E.2d 638 (1964), State v. Hanson, 73 N.W.2d 135 (N.D. 1955).
9. State v. Painter, supra note 8.
10. There is a singular exception in the case of Brown v. State, 38 Ala. App. 312, 82
So.2d 806 (1955), where defendant voluntarily drank in private and, after becoming drunk,
was removed tb a public place by police officers. Certainly defendant's appearance in pub-
lic was involuntary, but obviously is better explained In terms of coercive force operat-
ing exterior to the defendant and against his will (i.e., repulsive police entrapment).
11. State v. Brown. 38 Kan. 390, 16 Pac. 259 (1888), Commonwealth v. Peter Hughes,
133 Mass. 496 (1882).
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public drunkenness with the stipulation that he be detained for hos-
pital care.
Notably, cruel and unusual punishment has been defined as
that which shocks the conscience of reasonable men12 and must be
considered in light of the developing civilization.18 Thus, newly
developed advances in psychology and psychiatry and the enlight-
ened treatment available for mentally disturbed people necessitate
a re-evaluation of punishment of the alcoholic; and it surely does
shock the conscience of reasonable men that the only recourse of the
court is to stigmatize his behavior as criminal by jailing him. The
better alternative is to place him m a medical institution.
The plight of the alcoholic is not unlike that of the drug addict.
Both the alcoholic and the narcotic have an uncontrollable com-
pulsion toward their respective habits and in the course of satisfy-
ing them, are drawn compulsively to commit illegal acts, i.e., public
intoxication and illegal possession of narcotics. In a decision re-
garding an addict's possession of narcotics, the Supreme Court
enunciated a broad, generic principle which would permit the in-
stant case to fall within its ambit. 14 It declared unconstitutional
as cruel and unusual punishment any criminal statute which punishes
a status involuntarily assumed. This ruling was invoked in a later
case to strike down a North Carolina act which criminally punished
public drunkenness of an alcoholic.15
The language of "unwilled" and "ungovernable" excessive drink-
ing and public intoxication"6 also comes precariously close to the
irresistable impulse doctrine in insanity pleadings. In view of the
alcoholic's absence of self-control, there is a strong likelihood that
this plea could be presented as a defense for him to the charge
of public drunkenness. One problem to resolve, though, is establish-
ing whether the impulse originated solely from the mind or from
the body (i.e., physiological) or a combination of both. That it
derives wholly from the mind is the requirement.
North Dakota has not, by either judicial construction or specific
statute, provided a defense for the chronic alcoholic. Creation of a
statute would encounter obstacles, however. One is whether to ex-
tend the defense to major crimes, like murder, where the crime is
committed in the alcoholic's state of intoxication. But without the
same quantum of certainty to this solution in terms of proximate
cause, it would be politic to exclude the extension m any proposed
legislation for the moment and ensure passage of a defense for
12. State v. Evans, 73 Ida. 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952).
13. Ez parte Pickens, 101 F.Supp. 285 (D.C. Alaska 1966).
14. Robinson v. California, 870 U.S. 660 (1963).
15. Driver v. Hinnant, 3656 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
16. Ibid., Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (1966).
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public intoxication, an area which is critical." Another obstacle
appears to be the cost of adequate facilities for treatment. This
can be countervailed by eliminating the expenses of repetitive ar-
rest, trial, and incarceration of these sick people, with only a pre-
trial hearing essential to ascertain defendant's status.18 More im-
portantly, by dispensing psychiatric and medical ministrations to the
alcoholic, we would be applying all our sophistication to the cause
of the disease, rather than its symptom, in an unbenighted manner
RICHARD GLENN PETERSON
FALSE IMPRISONMENT-MITIGATION OF DAMAGES-ADMISSIBILITY
OF REPUTATION EVIIENCE-This action was instituted to recover
damages arising from the plaintiff's arrest without a warrant and
the resulting assault and battery The complaint also alleged damage
to reputation. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
held that the trial court erred in refusing to permit cross-examination
of plaintiff regarding the effect, if any, of the arrest on his reputation
and in refusing to permit a neighbor to testify relative to the plain-
tiff's reputation in the neighborhood, such testimony being relevant
to the damages allegedly suffered. Price v Phillips, 90 N.J. Super
480, 218 A.2d 167 (1966)
There are numerous definitions of reputation, but it is generally
agreed that the term connotes the common report which others
make about a man;' the talk about him which shows the opinion
in which he is held in his community 2 Reputation evidence offered
to prove character is hearsay for it represents a statement of com-
munity opinion made out of court and not under cross-examination.
To admit such evidence at all, it must be as an exception to the
hearsay rule.8 When reputation evidence is offered in mitigation
17. A bill to provide a defense for all crimes perpetrated by a chronic alcoholic where
it can be established that the offense was committed while he was intoxicated was pro-
posed and defeated by committee In the present 1967 North Dakota Legislature. This was
apparently too much for the legislative body to accept at one time.
18. Obviously, one determination as to defendant's alcoholic status will preclude any
further bothersome entanglement by him in the law enforcement machinery with respect
to the public intoxication offense. For example, in the Driver case, defendant was arrested
and convicted over 200 times. An early diagnosis of his alcoholism could have saved the
courts a considerable amount of time and expense.
1. 1 JoNES, --VIOaNCE, CaimrNAL AND CrvL § 165 (5th ed. 1968).
2. BLAcK, LAW DiCTiONARY (4th ed. 1951). Character and reputation are often used In-
terchangeably by many courts. E.g., Garrison v. State, 217 Ala. 322, 116 So. 705 (1928).
Although there is a distinction, both are subjective. Reputation represents what others
think a man is while character represents what he actually is.
3. 5 WIoGOR, EvrwVNca 1 1609 (Srd ed. 1940).
